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Introduction
Why does East Asia matter?

I: Summary

This paper is devoted to exploring the international relations (IR) concept of the “security
dilemma” through the historical case study of Japanese-American relations in the 1920s and
1930s. In my conclusion, I analyze the current Chinese – American strategic relationship through
the lens of the security dilemma, asking what lessons and warning signs the Japanese case has
for the developing Chinese – American strategic relationship. Central to this analysis is the
distinction between “security-seeking” states and “greedy” states. I argue that Imperial Japan
transitioned, in 1931, from a security-seeker to a greedy state, which largely explains Japan’s
aggressive foreign policy in the 1930s compared to its benign, negotiation-oriented foreign
policy in the 1920s. In the conclusion, I argue that China remains a “security-seeker” despite
rising tensions between her, the United States and regional U.S. allies such as Japan and the
Philippines. Moreover, the nascent security dilemma that exists today between China and the
U.S. pales in comparison to the severe security dilemma between Imperial Japan and the United
States in the interwar years. It is my hope that the Japanese-American case study will lend a
frame of reference to current Sino-American relations.
The paper is organized as follows: the introduction touches on the significance of East
Asia, and China in particular, to the United States today, chapter I introduces and parses the
concept of the security dilemma, chapter II explores the Japanese-American interwar security
dilemma, and the conclusion explores the current Sino-American strategic relationship in light of
the Japanese case study and security dilemma theory.
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II: The Rise of China
The rise of China in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is the defining story of
contemporary international relations. This is due to two factors: China’s remarkably rapid
economic growth following the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, and the corresponding increase in
Chinese military power. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a potential
challenger to U.S. hegemony in East Asia is emerging. President Obama’s administration has
devoted considerable effort to shifting the focus of U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle
East and toward East Asia. As Jeffrey Goldberg wrote of Barack Obama in a recent Atlantic
expose, “For years, the ‘pivot to Asia’ has been a paramount priority of his. America’s economic
future lies in Asia, he believes, and the challenge posed by China’s rise requires constant
attention.”1
A few figures demonstrate the gravity of China’s rise, and the growth of the region as a
whole. In 1980, at the beginning of Deng’s tenure, China “ranked twenty-sixth among the
world’s trading nations. By 2009 the country had become the world’s biggest exporter of goods
(ahead of Germany) and the second-biggest importer (after the United States).”2 Of the fifteen
busiest ports in the world, seven are located in China, and eleven total are located in East Asia.
As China’s total share of global trade continued to rise, her export surplus narrowed from a high
of $298.1 billion in 2008 to $154.9 billion in 2011, indicating China’s growing importance as a
market for international goods.3 Intraregional trade has grown as well, signaling regional
economic integration. Trade between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

1

Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016.
Sebastian Heilmann and Dirk H. Schmidt, China’s Foreign Political and Economic Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2014), 83.
3
Ibid., 84-85.
2
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(ASEAN) states grew from $41.6 billion in 2001 to $361.2 billion in 2011. By 2010, China had
become ASEAN’s largest trading partner.4
In 1992, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that
China spent $21.9 billion on defense. By 2002, that number had more than doubled, to $45.9
billion.5 By 2014, SIPRI was putting Chinese defense expenditures at around $216 billion,6
second only to the United States which has hovered (including war funding) between a high of
$748 billion and a low of $577 billion during the presidency of Barack Obama.7 Whatever the
exact figure is, Chinese defense spending now eclipses the third biggest spender, Russia, which
clocked in at just $84.5 billion in 2014, according to SIPRI. Whether by economic or military
measures, modern China has become a force to be reckoned with.
II: The Japanese-American Security Dilemma

In examining the strategic relationship between Imperial Japan and the United States in
two decades prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, areas of conflict can be broken into two categories:
economic and military. The Japanese were sensitive to the possibility of intervention by the U.S.
(and Britain, following the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance) to disrupt Japanese interests
in China. Japan, an island nation with few resources and a growing population, felt that her
economic interests in China were crucial to industrial-economic vitality. Eventually, Japan would
choose to secure these interests by force, but the willingness of the Anglo powers to abstain from

4

Ibid., 28.
Ibid., 58.
6
“Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 13 April 2015,
http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=496
7
“National Defense Budget Estimates for FY16, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),” United
States Department of Defense, March 2015. See pp. 133-139, Table 6-8,
5

http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY16_Green_Book.pdf
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addressing the “political” issues of Japanese interests in China during the Washington arms
negotiations is an example of why differentiating between peripheral and core interests is crucial
in high-stakes negotiations. The potential for conflict over military issues was more
straightforward: because the U.S. controlled territories in East Asia, and was dependent on
imported resources from Southeast Asia to fuel its economy, it was far more sensitive to Japanese
naval power than to questions of Chinese territorial integrity.
I argue that in the 1920s, Japan pursued a negotiated settlement of the Pacific security
dilemma with the United States and Great Britain through the Washington and London naval
treaties, effectively resolving the Pacific security dilemma. In the 1930s, I argue that Japan
transitioned to a greedy state with an imperialist-expansionist foreign policy which was
uninterested in negotiated settlement and very difficult to deter.

III: The Sino-American Security Dilemma

Today, the potential for conflict between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China
remains high. Nearly all countries in East and Southeast Asia have increased bilateral trade
volumes with China, including U.S. treaty allies such as South Korea and Japan. To facilitate and
protect its regional economic interests, China is attempting to position itself as the “United States
of East Asia;” a regional economic and military hegemon capable of creating favorable economic
and military conditions in its geopolitical neighborhood. Just as Japanese naval hardliners feared
that the Washington treaty amounted to nothing less than an attempt by the Anglo-American
powers to encircle Japan and keep her in a permanent position of military inferiority, some in
Beijing are hostile to China’s encirclement by American military power and U.S. treaty allies in
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the region. Moreover, China, much like Imperial Japan, feels that it has “special interests” in the
region that are unfairly threatened by the Western order that it did not contribute to and never
agreed to support. Today, the strategic relationship between China and the U.S. has become
strained by Chinese attempts to test the boundaries of that order, especially by claiming islands
and waters in the South China Sea that are claimed by a number of other states in region. These
provocations have led to a tit-for-tat naval escalation between the U.S. and the PRC. If the U.S.
and China cannot deescalate the emerging security dilemma, there is serious potential that “all of
Asia, and perhaps other regions as well, could be divided in a new cold war. Should this happen,
the prospects of confrontation and conflict would certainly grow.”8

8

Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy? China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2011), 36.
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Chapter I: Security Dilemma Theory
Implications for Optimal and Sub-Optimal State Behavior

I: The Security Dilemma and Great Power Politics

The security dilemma has long been at the heart of realpolitik. According to Ken Booth
and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Thucydides “argued that what led to war in ancient Greece between
Athens and Sparta was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this had caused in Sparta.”9
Booth and Wheeler argue that the enduring significance of the security dilemma lies in that it
engages with what they call the “existential condition of uncertainty that characterizes all human
relations-”10 including, they add, international politics. Steps taken by one great power to shore
up its own security, namely by increasing offensive military capabilities, inadvertently cause
other great power(s) in the equation to feel insecure.
Why do states arm when it may simply invite a response in kind from other great powers,
running the triple risks – identified by Charles Glaser - of reduced offensive military capability,
increased value placed by the adversary on expansion, and “simply wasting money?”11 In order
to understand how the security dilemma can lead to mutual hostility and suspicion between great
powers, and sometimes even war, we must poses an understanding of how great powers end up
in such an undesirable situation. With an eye toward history and the current Chinese – American
strategic relationship, this will also help us understand why the Pacific Ocean has served as a

9

Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Uncertainty,” in Security Studies: An Introduction (2nd Edition), ed. Paul D.
Williams (London: Routledge, 2012), 141.
10
Ibid., 137.
11
Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 175.
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stage for two structural security dilemmas in the 20th century: an unsuccessfully managed
security dilemma between Imperial Japan and the United States in the interwar years, and the
budding security dilemma between China and the United States today. The maritime geography
of the region heavily influenced the Japanese-American security dilemma, but military
technology, Japanese interests in China and the offense-defense balance were also important
factors.

II: Anarchy and Uncertainty

Three conditions of the international system enable the security dilemma. First, John
Mearsheimer argues “that the international system is anarchic.”12 In other words, states are
forced to look after themselves – to pursue “self-help strategies” – because the international
system “comprises independent states that have no central authority above them.” To be sure,
there have been times when some “higher authority” has come to the assistance of besieged
states. Take two prolific United Nations- sanctioned interventions on behalf of besieged states in
the post-WWII era: South Korea; 1950, and Kuwait; 1991. Yet such sanctioned interventions
remain rare, and were nonexistent prior to WWII. Furthermore, in both cases, both interventions
were driven by and constituted of United States national interest and military power.
Second, Mearsheimer contends that “great powers inherently possess some offensive
military capability.”13 All states possess some capacity to harm their neighbors. Why are great
powers compelled to spend enormous sums of money on defense in both war and peace?
Kenneth Waltz suggests that “defense spending, moreover, is unproductive for all and

12
13

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2014), 30.
Ibid.

Clark 8

unavoidable for most. Rather than increased well-being, their reward is in the maintenance of
their autonomy.”14 However, defense spending can also serve as a constraint: much of the
impetus for the Japanese to engage in the Washington Naval Arms Conference in 1921 stemmed
from serious concern over Japan’s ability to fund the ambitious “eight-eight” fleet plan. Japanese
naval planners, concerned about the swift growth of American naval power during World War I
and the possibility of American military intervention to enforce its “Open Door” policy in China,
sought an ambitious naval building program for eight battleships and eight heavy cruisers.
However, as Navy Minister Kato Tomosaburo argued, Japan lacked the economic-industrial
resources to carry out such a plan.
Part of what makes great powers great is that they possess significant destructive
capability in the form of technologically advanced, professional militaries that eclipse the weaker
states in the system. With regard to the Japanese – American security dilemma in the 1920s and
30s, contemporary naval fleets served to obfuscate the offense-defense distinction due to the
pairing of extreme mobility with significant firepower. Today, in the South China Sea, modern
warships such as Ticonderoga-class cruisers pose a serious challenge for offense – defense
differentiation, combining a mobile missile defense platform with anti-air, anti-surface, and antisubmarine warfare capabilities.
Third, Mearsheimer contends that “states can never be certain about other states’
intentions.”15 While Mearsheimer is quick to clarify that great powers do not exist in a state of
permanent hostility to other great powers, when two states are engaged in a security dilemma the
stakes are raised significantly with regard to this problem of uncertainty. Booth and Wheeler
describe this as the “other minds problem… some degree of understanding, sympathy, and

14
15

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 1979), 107.
Ibid., 31.
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(even) empathy is usually possible, but when it comes to matters of national security, the degree
of confidence required by national security planners has to be very high.”16 As Waltz puts it,
“because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so – or live at
the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors.”17 This observation helps to explain the
perpetually high state of arming among the great powers. Uncertainty is at the heart of the
security dilemma: no state can ever be certain of another’s intentions.

II: Defining the Security Dilemma – Two Kinds of States

Robert Jervis offers a simple definition of the security dilemma: “many of the
means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”18
Uncertainty is such a significant contributing factor to the security dilemma that Booth and
Wheeler identify it as the first part of a two-part dilemma. The first part of the security dilemma
is a “dilemma of interpretation” about the motives and intentions of the adversary state: “those
responsible have to decide whether perceived military developments are for defensive or selfprotection purposes only (to enhance security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for
offensive purposes (to seek to change the status quo to their advantage.”19 The second is “a
dilemma of response,” where “decision makers then need to determine how to react. Should they
signal, by words and deeds, that they will react in kind, for deterrent purposes? Or should they
seek to signal reassurance?”20 If the dilemma of interpretation is resolved to find that the

16

Booth and Wheeler, “Uncertainty,” 140.
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 102.
18
Ibid., 171.
19
Booth and Wheeler, “Uncertainty,” 139.
20
Ibid.
17
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opposing state poses “a definite threat to one’s own national security,” then “there is no longer a
security dilemma; the relationship is best understood as a strategic challenge.”21
The shift from security dilemma to “strategic challenge” implies that the state posing the
“strategic challenge” has foreign policy objectives that are fundamentally incompatible with the
security of the other state(s) in the equation. In turn, this suggests that the challenger is not a state
that seeks only domestic security and territorial integrity. Rather, it is what Glaser calls a “greedy
state.”
In a security-dilemma scenario with at least one greedy state, Glaser suggests that “the
puzzle largely disappears: the incompatibility of states’ goals provides a straightforward
explanation for competition and conflict.”22 A greedy state has different goals than a securityseeker, as it would be difficult to argue that conflict between great powers enhances the security
of the participating states. As I show in chapter two, Imperial Japan in the 1930s was fully aware
that policies such as the annexation of Manchuria, abrogation of the Washington and London
naval treaties, the resumption of intensive naval arming, and eventually imperial expansion into
European-held colonial possessions in Southeast Asia would bring Japan into direct conflict with
the United States. These policies also violated international norms regarding sovereignty and
territorial integrity; namely, that it is wrong to take what is not yours by force. Finally, and most
damningly from a strategic perspective, there is evidence that hardline Japanese policymakers in
the 1930s appreciated that Japan continued to occupy a position of industrial inferiority to the
United States.
In short, Japan pursued such policies not because it sought security in a traditional sense,
which can be defined by the absence of conflict with other states, particularly other great powers.

21
22

Ibid., 141.
Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” 190.
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It sought a warped sense of “security” informed by a mindset of total-war inevitability: war with
the U.S. would come, it was only a question of when. Thus, to give Japan the best chance at
winning such a conflict, Japanese foreign policy sought to create an autarkic, self-sufficient
empire from Manchuria to the Dutch East Indies. The tragic irony is that such policies greatly
accelerated the likelihood of war with the United States.
In contrast, a security-seeking state seeks only enough military power to adequately
defend its homeland and existing possessions. Moreover, a security-seeker will pursue a foreign
policy oriented toward cooperation and negotiation with potential competitors. As the
Washington and London naval treaties concluded between Japan, the U.S. and Great Britain
demonstrate, “arms control agreements that limit both countries’ current or future ability to
perform offensive missions communicate a lack of greed, since a greedy state sees greater value
in offensive missions than does a pure security seeker.”23 When two security-seekers adopt
competitive arming policies when engaged in a security dilemma, they do so only because the
dilemma of interpretation about the other’s motives has not yet been resolved. If competitive
arming policies continue after the dilemma of interpretation has been resolved, this is a strong
indicator that the state believes it is no longer facing a security-seeker, but rather a greedy state.
To be sure, security-seeking states that have an interest in maintaining the status quo will
likely have interests that extend beyond strict defense of the homeland and the military balance
of power. For example, “defending the status quo often means protecting more than territory.
Nonterritorial interests, norms, and the structure of the international system must be maintained.
If all status-quo powers agree on these values and interpret them in compatible ways, problems
will be minimized.”24 In the 1920s, Japan and the United States shared a similar “value system”

23
24

Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” 181.
Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 185.
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regarding the nature of the international system and the balance of power in the Pacific. In the
1930s, however, Japan pursued a foreign policy based on an entirely different value system that
was no longer compatible with the American conception of normative great power behavior and
the structure of the international system. Today, China is seeking to test the boundaries of the
liberal-institutional international system built by the U.S. in the wake of World War II in ways
that have caused great concern in Washington.

III: The Prisoner’s Dilemma

Jervis uses a game-theory mechanism to explain the same problems faced by decision
makers engaged in a security dilemma: the Prisoner’s Dilemma.25 Jervis agrees with
Mearsheimer in that “because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and enforce
international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if other cooperate
may bring disaster if they do not.”26 Anarchy, uncertainty and offensive military capabilities
push great powers into Jervis’ Prisoner’s Dilemma.

25
26

Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 171.
Ibid., 167.
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Fig. 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Cooperate
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2

Defect

1

Cooperate

State B
2

4
4

3
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1

3

In the above diagram, the numbers 1-4 indicate the order of action preference for both
State A and State B. There are only two behavioral choices for both states: to cooperate, or to
defect. In a two-state security dilemma, there are four possible outcomes: CC (cooperatecooperate), DD (defect-defect), CD (cooperate-defect), or DC (defect-cooperate). Because states
in the international system exist in a state of anarchy and “unresolvable uncertainty,” if the
“game is to be played only once, the only rational choice is to defect.”27 Hence, the order of
action preference for both states is as follows: DD  CC  DC  CD. This is a cynical
perspective on international politics and, moreover, it is possible for great powers to both
compete and cooperate simultaneously. However, Jervis argues that “if the game is repeated
indefinitely,” as it will be as long as international politics exists, DD is no longer “the only
rational response.” In other words, the “security paradox,”28 where a situation of mutual

27
28

Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 171.
Booth and Wheeler, “Uncertainty,” 139.
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suspicion and hostility develops where none was intended, is not inevitable. Thus, the key
question for states facing a potential security dilemma is how to reduce uncertainty – and thus
suspicion – and increase the odds of mutual cooperation. Barring some promise of mutual
cooperation, however, the logical response remains to defect, as CD is the worst possible
outcome for either state.
Examples of cooperative behavior (what Booth and Wheeler call actions that “signal
reassurance”) include arms reductions, treaty propositions, trade agreements or at the least
security dialogues that seek to create mutual understanding or “codes of conduct” over disputed
issues. Cooperation, of course, is not a course of action free of suspicion or concern. As Waltz
points out, “when faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel
insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not ‘Will both of us
gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?’”29 Mutual hostility and suspicion are not inevitable. Securityseeking states interested in resolving the security dilemma must find ways to communicate
benign intentions to the other great powers involved. Key among these are “signaling” devices,
where the state pursues military and diplomatic policies that communicate a lack of greed. The
best strategy for ameliorating the security dilemma is multilateral, diplomatic negotiation that
can facilitate clear communicating regarding the national interest of the parties involved.
Unilateral signaling devices can include arms reductions, the acquisition of “defensive” weapon
systems, and abstaining from the use of bellicose foreign policy rhetoric that would suggest
greedy motives.
The series of naval conference held to reduce mutual suspicion between the Empire of
Japan and the United States in the 1920s and 30s illustrate the sensitivity to relative gains: the

29

Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 105.
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Japanese delegates in particular agonized over the precise fleet ratios. Would 60% of U.S. fleet
strength be sufficient? Or was 70% the absolute minimum? If a 60% ratio in capital ships was
attained, could a higher ratio of “auxiliary” ships and submarines be negotiated? When the stakes
are perceived to be high, negotiation becomes correspondingly more challenging. Examples of
defection include significant levels of arming irrespective of what the other state signals or does,
or in the worst-case scenario, pursuing territorial aggrandizement through military conquest. In
Chapter 2, I argue that in the mid-1930s Imperial Japan transitioned from a “security seeking”
state that pursued strategies of cooperation with the United States into a “greedy” state that was
effectively impossible to deter. Glaser notes, however, that even “greedy” states can still feel
insecure.

III: Incentives for Cooperation and Defection

In Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz explores structural constraints on state
behavior, and incentives for cooperation and defection. Waltz argues that “the individual unit
acts for itself. From the coaction of like units emerges a structure that affects and constrains all
of them.”30 This is a macro perspective on international politics: as Waltz notes, “no state intends
to participate in the formation of a structure” that limits its course of action. One might ask,
indeed, how states inadvertently restrain themselves simply by participating in the modern state
system. Since the Westphalia peace treaties that ended the Thirty Year’s War in 1648, the
principle of state sovereignty has been the defining principle of international politics. States are,
in theory at least, free to conduct their internal and external affairs as they see fit. Yet it is, after

30

Ibid., 90.
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all, a small world: there is only so much territory, only so much wealth, and only so many
resources.
Hence, Waltz alludes to a categorical imperative when he writes that states, “out of the
interaction of their parts… develop structures that reward or punish behavior that conforms more
or less nearly to what is required of one who wishes to succeed in the system.”31 The security
dilemma is a structural mechanism of reward and punishment, but one that acts more strongly to
punish rather than reward. Wars occur when there are conflicts of national interest, or sometimes
merely the perceived possibility of conflict of national interest.
World War I is an example of a great-power conflict that had its roots in an intense
system-wide paranoia regarding the growth of German power. As Waltz describes, “if force is
used by one state or its use is expected, the recourse of other states is to use force or be prepared
to use it singly or in combination.”32 Again, we see here the dilemma of interpretation: recourse
to use of force can occur merely if its use is expected. The transition in Japanese naval circles
from viewing the United States primarily as a “budgetary enemy” to the likely adversary in a
Pacific showdown strongly drove the interwar security dilemma. An attack on one great power
by another, or the pursuit of security through territorial aggrandizement fails the categorical
imperative; these are the sort of existential fears which drive the security dilemma and thus
provide incentives for mutual restraint amongst great powers.
Jervis identifies three challenges that make international cooperation difficult. The first is
that there exists “the potent fear that even if the other state supports the status quo, it may
become dissatisfied later.”33 This is primarily a problem of being unable to predict the nature of

31

Ibid., 92.
Ibid., 113.
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Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 168.
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future national leadership. In other words, even if the present government is willing to cooperate,
future governments may be more inclined to defect, increasing incentives for the other play to
simply defect now rather than risk being put in a “CD” situation in the future. Again, the Japan –
U.S. relationship in the interwar years illustrates this challenge: Japanese naval leadership was
open to negotiating naval armaments in the 1920s, as they recognized the economic and
industrial challenge of competing with the United States in a condition of “total war,” a prophetic
observation. However, in the 1930s, the “fleet faction” based in the Naval General Staff came to
dominate naval (and eventually, foreign) policy, purging the more moderate, pro-negotiation
leadership based in the Naval Ministry. Japanese historian Sadao Asada called this transition a
“milestone”34 on the road to war with the United States.
The second problem is that “in order to protect their possessions, states often seek to
control resources or land outside their own territory.”35 This can be both a cause and an effect of
great power competition. As Glaser notes, “making an adversary more insecure will often
increase its interest in expansion, since expansion can often increase security.”36 Glaser
concludes that this can be a negative outcome of rational decision-making by great powers. Great
powers arm in order to increase their own security, yet it is possible that arming practices may
incentivize the adversary state to seek territorial expansion, with the possible “net result” being
“a reduction in its security.”
Glaser contends that states that seek, or have achieved, territorial expansion are harder to
deter; I argue that the Japanese attempt to use territorial expansion in the 1930s to create the
“Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” appears to corroborate this claim. Yet the Japanese

34

Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2006): 172.
Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 168.
36
Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” 177.
35
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experience also begs another question: did Japan seek territorial expansion for security reasons,
in the face of growing U.S. naval power and colonial possessions in East Asia? Or, as a result of
the “hardline” takeover within the Japanese Navy and Army, was it a strategy of greed? In the
conclusion, I will ask the same question of China today: has encirclement by U.S. allies, and the
presence of significant U.S. military forces in East Asia encouraged Chinese leadership to push
harder in the South China Sea and elsewhere?
Jervis identifies the third problem of international politics as the security dilemma itself:
“many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of
others.”37 Jervis contends that “the fear of being exploited (that is, the cost of CD) most strongly
drives the security dilemma; one of the main reasons that international life is not more nasty,
brutish and short is that states are not as vulnerable as men are in a state of nature.”38 By this
same logic, “states that can afford to be cheated in a bargain or that cannot be destroyed by a
surprise attack can more easily trust others and need not react at the first, and ambiguous, sign of
menace.”39 Unit-level variables such as geography, population, and access to strategic materials
may have a significant impact on the perception by national leaders of the severity of the security
dilemma.
Japan, as an island nation, surely felt more vulnerable to attack and coercion than did the
continental U.S. Jervis looks to British-German naval competition prior to WWI as an example
of a security dilemma: although the British felt that the German fleet was much more of a threat
to her than the British fleet was to Germany (again, geography is a factor), “the British often
overlooked what Germans knew full well: ‘in every quarrel with England, German colonies and

37

Ibid., 171.
Ibid., 172.
39
Ibid., 172.
38

Clark 19

trade… were hostages for England to take.’”40 The British-German naval rivalry prior to WWI
illustrates the poignancy of what Booth and Wheeler identify as the “other minds problem:”
some degree of empathy is crucial to arriving at mutually cooperative efforts to ameliorate the
security dilemma.
Finally, Glaser identifies greed as an important variable that influences the “magnitude of
the security dilemma.” In a potential standoff between a greedy state and a security-seeker,
“arms control will tend to be riskier because it requires forgoing the opportunity to communicate
resolve by competing… unilateral restraint designed to signal the state’s security motives
becomes still more dangerous,”41 because it opens up the security-seeker to coercion by the
greedy state (a cooperate-defect scenario in terms of the Prisoner’s Dilemma). Thus, in both the
Japanese and Chinese cases, we must do our best to discern whether those states were (and are)
“security-seekers” or “greedy.”
Thinking about tensions between great powers in terms of the security dilemma provides
a useful framework for analyzing optimal and sub-optimal great power policies in the face of
potential competition and conflict. In the Japanese-American interwar case, it gives us a
framework to ask whether war could have been avoided by placing greater emphasis on mutual
cooperation, or whether the “greedy” Japan of the 1930s became almost immune to deterrence
and negotiated compromise. Today, with tensions rising between the U.S., its regional allies, and
China, it provides a useful framework to ask if Sino-American conflict is inevitable, or whether
Chinese and American regional interests can be reconciled. While acknowledging that any
emerging security dilemma between China and the United States is still very much in the nascent
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stages, it gives us a tool to evaluate Chinese policies such as the “nine-dash line,” and American
strategies such as the “rebalance” to Asia.

Chapter II: Imperial Japan and the United States, 1920-1941
Transition from Security Seeker to Greedy State
I: Summary – From Negotiation to Competition

December 7th, 1941: “a day which will live in infamy.” The New York Times called the
Japanese attack an act of “sublime insanity,” the Los Angeles Times described the Japanese
choice as “an insane adventure that for fatalistic abandon is unsurpassed in the history of the
world.”42
In truth, the Pearl Harbor attack came as little surprise to the Roosevelt administration,
which had spent the better part of the 1930s attempting to delay a Pacific clash as long as
possible. The question was not if, but when. I argue that Imperial Japan transitioned from a state
that sought only adequate power to defend the home islands – a “security seeker” in terms of the
security dilemma – to a “greedy” state that sought expansion for reasons that could not be
justified solely in terms of national defense. As Joseph Maiolo put it, “the tidal-like effects of
arming did not force anyone to choose war. In Rome and Tokyo we can imagine alternative
choices being formulated.”43 In fact, Japanese foreign policy throughout the 1920s pursued those
“alternative choices.” It was only the in the 1930s that the loss of control over foreign policy by
the pro-negotiation civilian leadership paved the way for an aggressive policy of imperial
expansion.
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In the 1920s, Imperial Japan was a state with clear civilian control over the military. The
civilian government, conscious of the reality that in a condition of “total war” Japan would be
unable to out-build and out-produce the United States, sought to participate in a series of
multilateral naval arms treaties with Great Britain and the United States: the Washington and
London Naval Arms conferences, concluded in 1922 and 1930, respectively. The United States
sought to limit Japanese naval power to prevent its Pacific possessions of Hawaii, the Philippines
and Guam from being easily taken as “hostages” in a potential conflict. The Japanese, aware of
the severe economic and industrial imbalance between themselves and the Americans, sought a
ratio of naval forces adequate to defend the Japanese homeland from a potential assault by
American forces, but not strong enough to go on a warpath of imperial expansion. As we recall
from the previous chapter, “because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and
enforce international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others
cooperate may bring disaster if they do not.”44 Thus, neither state was willing to enact unilateral
arms reductions. It was only through an arduous negotiation process that binding treaties were
successfully concluded, ameliorating a genuine security dilemma between two Pacific powers
that sought to avoid conflict.
The transition of Imperial Japan from security-seeker to greedy state occurred in 1931
following the Mukden incident on 18 September, when the Japanese forcibly annexed the
resource-rich area of Manchuria (shortly renamed Manchukuo) in northern China. In doing so,
Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, who commanded the 10,000 strong occupation force, singlehandedly
“carved out an enclave bigger than France and Germany combined.”45 At the same time, an
increasingly powerful group of hardline naval officers based in the Naval General Staff was
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wresting control over naval (and eventually foreign) policy from the more moderate, pronegotiation leadership based in the Naval Ministry. From this point onward, the path for
southward expansion into European-held colonial possessions was clear, leading to a likely clash
of interests with the United States which imported the majority of its critical strategic resources
from European possessions in Southeast Asia. The decade-long road to Pearl Harbor began in
1931- from that point onward, Japanese foreign policy demonstrated little interest in genuine
negotiation, and the Roosevelt administration was forced to adopt competitive arming policies to
attempt to deter a Japanese attack for as long as possible.

II: Cooperation in the 1920s: an overview

Japanese foreign policy in the 1920s, however, was a very different story. Both Japan and
the United States recognized the clear potential for conflict in the Pacific, given American
possessions in East Asia and Japan’s geographic vulnerability as an island nation with few
indigenous strategic resources. Thus, both sides engaged in cooperative negotiation efforts in a
largely successful attempt to alleviate the security dilemma.
As Jervis points out, “technology and geography are the two main factors that determine
whether the offense or the defense has the advantage.”46 Japanese policymakers were keenly
attuned to these variables, especially as they pertained to modern naval capabilities. As naval
technology progressed and the cruising range of vessels increased, the Japanese increasingly
came to feel that the United State Navy was gaining the offensive edge, especially when taken in
conjunction with American possessions scattered across the Pacific which could serve as
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refueling and maintenance stations. As we will see, this led to the question of “fortification”
being placed at the center of the Japanese agenda at the Washington Naval Conference: the
Japanese were only willing to agree to the 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships if the United States agreed
to abstain from fortifying its pacific possessions. Despite the preexisting British-Japanese
alliance, Britain agreed prior to the beginning of negotiations to support the American position.
Japan, “taking for granted their British ally’s friendly support, had not even informally discussed
the matter with the British delegates.”47 Evidently, in the wake of the American contribution to
the allied war effort in Europe, Britain had calculated that it would be more advantageous to
begin shifting support away from Japan in light of growing U.S. industrial and military power.
Hardliner Kato Kanji, President of the Naval Staff College and Navy Minister Kato
Tomosaburo’s naval adviser at the conference, reacted violently to the shift in British attitude:
“The United States and Great Britain are banding together in oppressing Japan… In our view,
their intention obviously is to deprive the Imperial Navy of its predominance in the Orient.”48
For now, though, Kato Kanji and the nascent “fleet faction” would be unable to override Kato
Tomosaburo’s imperative to amicably resolve the Pacific security dilemma.
As we recall, Glaser adds two important elements to Jervis’ theory of the security
dilemma: first, to what degree can a state determine “…the extent of the adversary’s greed (that
is, motives beyond security.)” Second, how much information does the state have regarding “unit
level knowledge of the state’s motives?”49 These two factors have the potential to influence
whether a state pursues strategies of cooperation (negotiation) with the adversary, or whether it
chooses strategies of defection (competition). In the case of Japan in the 1920s, policymakers
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combined offense-defense balance assessment, an assessment of how “greedy” the United States
was and specific knowledge about U.S. naval capabilities to inform their decision to engage in
multilateral naval armament negotiations with the U.S. and Great Britain. On the balance of
things, the Japanese concluded that, even in an anarchic international environment, cooperation
was preferable to competition because of 1) Japan’s clear economic and industrial inferiority and
2) a lack of evidence suggesting that the U.S. had “greedy” motives in East Asia, or would seek
to “defect” after pursuing negotiations, putting Japan in the worst-case scenario of cooperatedefect (CD).
The Washington Naval Arms treaty was a major accomplishment, preserving (according
to the participants) Japan’s ability to effectively defend its homeland against a potential U.S.
naval blockade, while the 5:3 fleet ratio in favor of the United States ensured that Japan would
encounter very unfavorable odds if it launched offensive operations against U.S. possessions
such as Guam or Hawaii. Yet the Washington treaty also contained the seeds of a deep,
nationalistic dissatisfaction with the status quo for a group of hardline Japanese naval officers.
These men, rising to power in the early 1930s, would dramatically alter Japanese military and
foreign policy, putting Japan on a collision course with the United States.
The road to Pacific rapprochement and multilateral arms reductions was not guaranteed,
just as the reversal of these trends in the 1930s was not a foregone conclusion. In particular, it
was the control over naval and foreign policy in Japan by a group of moderate, pro-negotiation
diplomats and officers that made entreaties to the United States possible. Yet these policymakers,
on both sides of the pacific, were no Wilsonian idealists: they were realists who thought
explicitly in terms of the security dilemma, and who had to weigh the two critical variables of
capabilities and intentions to determine whether their counterparts in the United States sought to
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preserve a relatively neutral balance of power in the Pacific, or whether they sought to place
Japan in a clear position of military inferiority. In telling this story, we will see how state
preferences can be altered dramatically not only by changing material conditions in the
international system, but also by how individuals in positions of power and influence define the
national interest.

II: Harbingers of Conflict

By the 1920s, Japan and the United States faced a potential clash of national interests that
began to drive the security dilemma. This nascent security dilemma had begun to develop prior
to World War I, when the United States embarked on its first major naval buildup in the creation
of President Roosevelt’s globe-trotting Great White Fleet. As early as the 1900s, an influential
professor of naval strategy at the Japanese Naval Staff College put his finger on the two issues
that were to dominate Japanese military policy until the beginning of southward expansion in
1939: China, and the U.S. Navy. Future commander Akiyama Saneyuki, who “graduated from
the Naval Academy at the top of his class in 1890, barely ninety days after Mahan’s Influence of
Sea Power was published” was so devoted to the strategic teachings of the famed American that
he was “already deeply knowledgeable of Mahan’s Influence to the point of having memorized
portions of it.”50
What was Alfred Thayer Mahan’s thesis on the nature of sea power? “The first and most
obvious light in which the sea presents itself… is that of a great highway… these lines of travel
are called trade routes.”51 Mahan’s theory, in other words, had already entered a stage of
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globalization in which international trade was critical to the wealth and prestige of great powers.
Trade, of course, is not a zero-sum game: in its least politicized and restricted form, it is
precisely the opposite. What had greater potential to foment conflict among nations regarding
Mahan’s theory, however, was his corollary to international trade: “As a nation, with its unarmed
and armed shipping, launches forth from its own shores, the need is soon felt of points upon
which the ships can rely for peaceful trading, for refuge and supplies.”52 Mahan, while not
advocating for traditional colonial-imperialism (“I dread outlying colonies or interests, to
maintain which large military establishments are necessary”53) argued that global trade required
global naval power to protect that trade.
In turn, a navy capable of global power projection required friendly ports of call in every
economically relevant region, and the simplest way to ensure port access was to simply own the
port. In the Pacific, that meant the American possessions of the Philippines, Guam and Hawaiiall controlled by the U.S. since the 1890s. These possessions, naturally, could also serve as
military facilities- a strategic reality which began to increasingly worry Japanese naval officers
following the publication of Mahan’s Influence in 1890. In the most cynical sense, “neither the
United States nor Japan could assure protection for their territories by military and naval means
without compromising the defenses of the other. This problem would plague American and
Japanese statesmen down to 1941.”54 Yet Japanese foreign policy in the first two decades of the
new century remained unconcerned about stepping on American toes; L.M. Cullen argues that
“…Japan failed to appreciate the geopolitical implications of the pan-Pacific role which the
United States had acquired in 1898 (widened by the building between 1903 and 1913 of the
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Panama Canal).”55 A critical part of that “role” was the U.S. “declaration of its Open Doors
policy in Asia in 1899, calling for a level playing-field in access by outsiders to China.”56 The
Open Door policy would continue to haunt the Japanese-American strategic relationship up to
Pearl Harbor; hardliners in the 1930s would frequently cite alleged American willingness to back
up an essentially economic policy with overwhelming naval force as a key reason to expand the
Japanese navy. In short, the turn of the 20th Century was a time of dramatic change in East Asian
geopolitics- as the turn of the 21st would be as well.
From 1905 to 1908, “Akiyama devoted his full attention to devising a strategy against the
United States, which was then emerging as the Japanese navy’s hypothetical enemy.”57
Akiyama, along with many other disciples of Mahan in the Japanese Navy, must have felt alarm
upon witnessing Roosevelt’s new battle fleet, capable of projecting power around the world in
precisely the manner advocated by Mahan. Interestingly, in 1909, Akiyama “came to emphasize
the special importance of Manchuria” after “taking a fact-finding tour.” Specifically, Asada
recounts how “Akiyama gravitated toward the policy of expanding Japanese influence in China.
Increasingly he emphasized the prospect of conflict with the United States over the China
question.”58 Akiyama foreshadowed the events that would transpire twelve years later, when the
forcible Japanese annexation of Manchuria would mark the transition of Japan from a state that
sought only domestic security, to a greedy state that could not be swayed from pursuing an
aggressive agenda of imperialist expansion. For now, though, Akiyama was no alarmist:
reflecting on the large U.S. naval expansion that accompanied her involvement in World War I,
he cautioned that “the American building plan was occasioned by the European war… he
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dismissed the Japanese-American war scare as nonsense.”59 On China, however, he was much
more bullish: “If a foreign power, be it the United States or any other power, should infringe on
our traditional rights in East Asia… we fill fight to the last ship to resist such an attempt.”
Here, Akiyama combined an optimistic analysis of American intentions with a sharp
definition of Japanese national interest in China- questions that would continue to be
fundamental to war and peace in the Pacific. The Japanese interest in China would coalesce more
firmly during the Versailles negotiations that followed the end of European hostilities: “… Japan
went on to occupy the German possessions in Shantung [Peninsula] and the German islands in
the north Pacific.”60 Cullen contends that these acquisitions “changed Japan’s position from one
of defending itself against Western encroachment [a tack pursued with merit by the Chinese
since the First Opium War in 1839] into an exploitative role identical to that of other
countries.”61 However “exploitative” Japan’s acquisition of the Shantung Peninsula was, Japan’s
participation in the Versailles negotiations alongside the United States, Britain, France and Italy
marked an important transition from bystander to participant in the great power politics of East
Asia.
III: The Road to Washington
For the time being, concern over the naval balance of power overrode concerns about
Japanese intervention in China. In fact, the Washington Conference delegates would explicitly
abstain from discussing such “political questions,” choosing instead – to the great relief of the
Japanese – to focus exclusively on fleet ratios and the question over fortification of existing
American possessions in East Asia. This was also a reflection of American national interest: as
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long as the U.S. could continue to trade with China, Japanese activities in Manchuria did not
merit inclusion into already fraught negotiations over the naval balance of power. However,
when Japan began to expand into European-held colonial possessions in Southeast Asia in the
mid-1930s, this would mark the point of no return for the United States. We will explore the
ramifications of Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia following Japan’s distinctive shift from
security-seeker to greedy state- but for now, the Washington Naval Arms Conference is an
outstanding case study in how to ameliorate a “sincere” security dilemma.
Glaser, who clarified the two variables of unit-level knowledge and the extent of the
adversary’s greed within Jervis’ classic cooperate-defect model of the security dilemma, also
stresses that “even if arms races correlate with war, they do not cause it.”62 Rather, a state’s
decision to go to war is driven not by the existence of an arms race but by the “security
environment” writ large, which is “determined by material variables – power and the offensedefense balance – and by information variables, with the most important being the state’s
information about its adversary’s motives and goals.”63 In the context of a state’s decision to
defect or cooperate, with the ultimate form of defection being an attack against the adversary,
arms races are byproducts of the security environment. They are one of the primary forms of
competition, and thus can either be optimal or sub-optimal, depending on whether the state
determines it is facing a security-seeker or a greedy state. While Maiolo takes pains to describe
how the inter-war arms race drove Japan to increasingly seek a centralized state and economy
that necessarily sacrificed personal and political freedoms,64 he describes the Japanese naval
arms race with the U.S. in the 1930s as a deliberate decision to support and enable the national
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policy of imperial expansion. In other words, the arms race did not cause the Pacific war, it
merely aided and abetted a greedy foreign policy that put Japan on a collision course with the
United States.
In the 1920s, Japanese policymakers (and their American counterparts) determined that to
engage in an arms race was sub-optimal given the available information about 1) the offensedefense balance and 2) information about the adversary’s motives. Japan in the 1920s was also
fiscally insecure, adding domestic pressure to avoid an extremely costly naval arms race. The
Great War itself was a boon to Japanese industry, as it provided a large opening in the
international export market: “Japanese manufacturing and agriculture prospered… National
income doubled. New steel, machinery and chemical factories sprang up.”65 However, as the
close of hostilities afforded an opportunity for Japan to increase its extraterritorial possessions in
East Asia, it also meant shrinking demand for Japanese goods. As Maiolo relates, “…the demand
for Japanese goods fell, and the country suffered a financial shock, mass bankruptcies and rice
riots. The postwar stagnation persisted, punctuated only by another financial panic in 1927, until
things got much worse after 1929.”66 To those responsible for weighing the costs vs. benefits of
pursuing an aggressive naval building program, the economic conditions at the time appeared
nearly prohibitive. Glaser’s admonition that arms races can cause states to “simply waste money”
would be a severe understatement when applied to Japan in the 1920s.
Since 1907, Japanese naval policy was defined by three interrelated doctrines: “(1) the
concept of the United States as the navy’s ‘hypothetical enemy;’ (2) the need for a 70 percent
fleet ratio against the U.S. Navy as a strategic imperative; and (3) its corollary, a program for
building a first-line ‘eight-eight fleet’ consisting of eight modern (dreadnought) battleships
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displacing 20,000 tons and eight armored cruisers.”67 On the face of it, such a plan – which
effectively amounted to a force-structure blueprint for the IJN – seems reasonable. From a
security dilemma standpoint, the primary risk of a naval building program is that “the benefits of
the increased capabilities” may fail to “more than offset the dangers created by the adversary’s
insecurity.”68 For now, it is important to note that Japanese policymakers faced the exact same
dilemma in the 1920s: would increasing naval capabilities more than compensate for the
inevitable alarm caused in Washington? This calculation was complicated by a factor that has
rarely placed serious pressure on U.S. planners: the clear economic and industrial inferiority of
Japan in the interwar decades, especially problematic because “warship building would gobble
up huge amounts of money, steel, plant and skilled labor.”69 Asada concurs, noting that
“although the appropriation for the eight-eight fleet plan, to be completed in 1927, was finally
approved in 1920, he [Navy Minister Kato Tomosaburo] saw that the plan was beyond Japan’s
financial capability.”70 For two important reasons, then, arms negotiation with the U.S. became
an attractive option for ameliorating an emerging security dilemma, especially for Naval
Minister and future Prime Minister Kato Tomosaburo.
The concept of a 7:10 ratio of Japanese fleet strength to American fleet strength “was
reinforced by war games, tabletop maneuvers, and fleet exercises, and it crystallized into a firmly
held consensus – even obsession – within the Japanese navy until the eve of the Pearl Harbor
attack.”71 The basic calculation was that, as Mahan observed, distance was a factor that served to
reduce the combat effectiveness of naval fleets that had to travel thousands of miles to reach their
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intended target. The American navy estimated that every 1,000 miles of the Pacific their ships
were forced to cross would result in 10 percent reduction in fighting effectiveness due to “wear
and tear, bottom fowling, the enemy’s attacks en route, and declining morale of officers and
men.”72 These strategic calculations imply that while the U.S. navy was considered a serious
potential threat, the offense-defense balance still remained firmly in favor of the Japanese
position, primarily due to geographic realities. As Jervis put it, “when states are separated by
barriers that produce these effects, the security dilemma is eased, since both can have forces
adequate for defense without being able to attack.”73 Thus, taken in conjunction with the premise
that an attacking fleet would need at least 50% superiority in fleet strength, the roughly 3,000
mile journey to Japanese-controlled waters would sap 30% of American combat effectiveness. In
short, “to the Japanese navy, the seemingly minor margin between 60 and 70 percent made the
difference between victory and defeat.” In the 1930s, Japanese naval hardliners would argue that
advances in technology had effectively negated the defensive advantage of the vast Pacific
expanse, but for now, the offense-defense balance suggested that the Japanese had a margin of
inherent security that favored avoiding a naval arms race.
Heading into the Washington Conference, Navy Minister Kato Tomosaburo –
accompanied by his antagonist, the hardliner Vice Admiral Kato Kanji – had two objectives: to
secure a fleet ratio agreement that would at least give Japan a slightly better than 50/50 chance of
victory against the U.S. Navy, and to ensure that the American possessions of Guam and the
Philippines would remain unfortified- and thus incapable of servicing or repairing damaged
American ships. The fortification question was of such great importance to the Japanese that a
special committee formed by Kato Tomosaburo concluded that “should this [fortification]
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problem fail to be satisfactorily resolved, naval arms limitation would not only be meaningless
but may conceivably prove suicidal to Japan.”74
Kato Tomosaburo fared quite well in his efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement. Yet
his achievements would instill in the “other Kato,” Vice Admiral Kato Kanji, a sense of deep
national betrayal that would prove decisive in Japan’s shift to a greedy state in the early 1930s.
The Americans were unexpectedly open to Japanese entreaties, with assistant to Secretary of
State Charles Evan Hughes and State Department Special Counsel J. Reuben Clark’s memo on
the American conference strategy going so far as to note that “the problem of naval limitation is
of vital importance, but Far Eastern questions are only secondary… the doctrine of ‘special
relationship’ must be agreed upon. Japan is right in its claim that it has a special relationship in
China.”75 Hughes himself would make America’s genuine interest in multilateral disarmament
clear on the opening day of the conference when he presented the following three proposals: “(1)
a ten-year ‘naval holiday’ during which each power would cease construction; (2) limitation of
the fleets of the great powers by tonnage according to the ratio of 10:10:6 for the United States,
Great Britain and Japan; and (3) an itemized plan for scrapping ships in accord with a ‘stop now’
formula.”76 In the final treaty signed on February 6th, 1922, the two core issues of fleet ratio and
Pacific fortification were resolved as such: Japan accepted the 10:10:6 fleet ratio, and “the
United State promised to maintain the status quo regarding bases in the Philippines and Guam.”77
The Pacific security dilemma and the impetus for both sides to fortify their existing
possessions had been halted in their tracks. The agreement, it could be argued, was actually more
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favorable to Japan: while the 10:6 fleet ratio was less desirable than the original negotiating
position of 10:7, it nonetheless maintained Japanese naval dominance in East Asia- especially
considering that the agreement to abstain from fortifying regional American possessions meant
that those territories could easily be captured by Japan in the event of hostilities breaking out, a
fate that would indeed befall the Philippines when Japanese forces attacked the day after the
Pearl Harbor raid. As for the British, Lisle A. Rose notes that “the British Admiralty surrendered
for the life of the agreement (that is, practically up to 1935) buildup of the Singapore base, thus
leaving the Royal Navy ‘without a berth east of Malta capable of accommodating and refitting a
capital ship.”78 This, too, would prove prophetic: the fall of Singapore in 1942 dealt a shocking
blow to the wartime government of Winston Churchill. On a broad scale, Rose contends that the
U.S. “had sacrificed a fleet of sufficient size to ensure effective power projection in the Atlantic
and the Pacific.”79
Paul Kennedy surmises that “despite the protests of admirals on all sides, the leading
statesmen in Whitehall and Washington had decided that the economic and social costs of an
arms race were not justified by the international situation, and would be unpopular domestically;
while in Japan a quasi-liberal regime was not intent, in those years at least, in challenging the
status quo by force.”80 Prior to the Washington negotiations, the British, through their
conversations with the Dutch, had begun to sense the potential for conflict with Japan over
British and Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. Following conversations with his
Dutch counterpart in Batavia in September 1915, the British consul related that “In fact so
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greatly are they [the Dutch] obsessed with the idea that Japan is only waiting her own time to
take possession of the Netherlands East Indies, that they regard Japan as a more serious menace
than Germany.”81 This prompted the British consul to muse that despite the Anglo-Japanese
alliance, “Perhaps the British should obtain from the Japanese Government some declaration of
their policy…, which if communicated to the Netherlands Government might go far to allay the
apprehensions” of the Dutch, and demonstrate the solidity of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Following World War I, the British Foreign Office’s Japan expert, Frank AshtwonGwatkin, argued that “with Netherlands India, the Philippines, and British India all on the way to
autonomy, ‘the future of South-East Asia’ was in an ‘unsettled condition’ and required ‘careful
and anxious watching… the result of a further upheaval, such as a Japanese – American war,
might be most unwelcome both to us and to the Dutch.’”82 At Washington, from the Dutch
perspective, “The Anglo-Japanese alliance – which had seemed to encourage, though it had also
operated to restrain, the Japanese – was ended.”83 The alliance, which had come to be viewed as
a less effective long-term restraint against Japanese ambition than the conclusion of the
“quadruple treaty” between the United States, Britain, Japan and France, was replaced with the
promise from the signatories that “as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to
their insular possessions and insular dominions, in the region of the Pacific Ocean.”84 Each great
power also submitted identical but separate notes “declaring their intention of respecting the
island possessions of Holland.” The Washington treaty, of course, also had the additional benefit
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of ending the emerging naval arms race, something that could not be accomplished by
maintaining the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
For the Americans, it ensured that the Japanese could do nothing to attempt to rectify the
naval imbalance, preserving an absolute American advantage in overall naval strength from
which they could quickly build from in the event of war. Furthermore, delegates to the
Washington Conference “quickly agreed that there were to be no restrictions on the construction
of what had traditionally been considered fleet ‘auxiliary’ vessels. Britain, Japan, the United
States, France and Italy were free to build as many ships carrying 8-inch guns and below as they
liked, so long as a 10-10-7-3.67-3.67 parity was maintained among the five signatories in the 6inch-gun ‘light’ cruiser category and a 10-10-6-3.67-3.67 parity in ‘heavy’ 8-inch-gun
cruisers.”85 In line with Hughes’ initial proposal, “there would be a widely hailed ten-year
‘holiday’ on the building of battleships and battle cruisers, which could mount at most 16-inch
guns on a 35,000 ton hull.”86
Whether the failure to restrict vessels in the “auxiliary” category favored Japan or the
U.S. more is an open question. A strong argument in favor of the Japanese position could be
made given that one attractive way to offset Japan’s industrial inferiority would be to pursue an
“interceptive” strategy by which Japanese submarines and fast cruisers would harass and degrade
the American fleet as it made its way from Hawaii to Japanese waters.
The other crucial consequence of the Washington treaty was the emboldening of the naval
hardliners led by Vice Admiral Kato Kanji. Following Kato Tomosaburo’s death in 1923, the
pro-negotiation naval moderates would increasingly find themselves marginalized by a growing
cohort of hardliners who believed Japan’s national security had been deeply wounded by the
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Washington Treaty. Rose suggests that “by 1925 Kato Kanji’s Fleet faction, with its growing
belief that the U.S. Navy had become ‘the arch-antagonist with whom hostilities were
unavoidable,’ threatened to dominate opinion within and beyond the Imperial Japanese Navy.”87
Yet even a broad shift in strategic thinking within the IJN was not nearly enough to
justify Japan as having shifted from security-seeker to greedy state. As we will see, it was the
combination of a number of factors including the rise of IJN hardliners that effected that shift
following the Japanese annexation of Manchuria in 1931. Had Kato Kanji and his disciples
merely advocated for abrogation of the treaty and a resumption of arming on a national security
basis, this would have returned the broad contours of the American-Japanese relationship to that
of a traditional security dilemma. Yet, as we will see, something far more dramatic occurred: the
Japanese navy became convinced, for a variety of reasons stemming from a sense of national
insult at the Washington Treaty to competition with the army for resources, that a national policy
of “southward expansion” into European-held territories was necessary to justify massively
increased naval budgets. This is where the United States finally drew a “red line:” Southeast
Asia, for strategic reasons, simply could not be permitted to fall into Japanese hands.

III: Road from Security to Greed – the Washington System breaks down

The key events that serve as signposts on Japan’s transition to a greedy state bent on
complete regional domination are as follows: the rise to power of the hardline faction in the IJN,
the annexation of Manchuria, Japan’s position at the London Naval Conference of 1935, and
finally the national policy of “southward expansion.”
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The London Naval Treaty of 1930, which served primarily to renew the terms set by the
Washington treaty, is described by Asada as a “pyrrhic victory” by the moderate government
leadership. A sense of the growing political chaos in Japan over military and foreign policy is
captured by Asada’s summary of the events surrounding the London treaty: “the internal division
over the treaty was accompanied by a head-on collision between the government and the navy.
This in turn brought about a major political crisis that triggered a series of assassinations, starting
with the attack on Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi in November 1930.”88 From this point
onward, the Naval General Staff – home of the “fleet faction” headed by Kato Kanji – would
dominate naval, and eventually foreign policy in a quest to rectify the perceived slights of the
Washington system. One consequence of this, however, would be a national policy of imperial
expansion that could not be rationalized as a security-seeking move. The men in charge of this
policy knew full well that to expand south into European-held possessions – first by moving into
Vichy French-controlled Indochina, and then (and much more problematically) into the
Netherlands East Indies – would be to put Japan on an inevitable collision course with the United
States.
How did the rise of the naval hardliners contribute to a greedy foreign policy? It goes
without saying that foreign policy should inform military policy, not the other way around- yet
this is precisely what happened with the Japanese navy in the 1930s. Following the conclusion of
the London treaty, which saw a repeat of the same arduous debates over fleet ratios at the
Washington Conference, “most of the supporters of the Washington and London naval treaties –
heirs to Kato Tomosaburo’s legacy – were systematically ‘purged’ in 1933-1934 by Navy
Minister Osumi Mineo, who was backed by the anti-treaty group, including especially Kato
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Kanji… The navy was now under the control of the fleet faction.”89 These efforts were aided by
Fleet Admiral Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, a “Germanophile” who served as the head of the Naval
General Staff from 1933-1941.90 Having a thoroughly sympathetic member of the Japanese royal
family would be a great boon to the hardliners, who would use Prince Fushimi to legitimize their
policies and gain access to the emperor’s ear.
Prince Fushimi would be instrumental in pressuring the government to release funding to
rapidly expand the Japanese navy in the early 1930s – as Asada notes, “the United States did not
start building to treaty limits until 1933, and by this time Japan was building close to the 70
percent ratio.”91 The Manchuria incident of 1931 severely aggravated relations with the United
States, and the Japanese navy regarded the outbreak of fighting in Shanghai in 1932 as a
“godsend, an opportunity to demonstrate its raison d’etre and enhance its armaments in
competition with the army.” By this point, the primary concern of the Naval General Staff – now
firmly in control of naval policy, was to secure massively increased funding for a naval building
program. This meant looking to foreign crisis as justification for naval expansion and, if need be,
creating those crisis themselves. Following the failure of the Second London Naval Conference,
where Japanese demands for absolute naval parity with the United States were (predictably)
rejected, the U.S. and Japan found themselves locked in another naval arms race with little
chance of negotiated settlement.
At the First London Conference, “the last harmonious international disarmament
conference to convene for a half century,” Japan’s representative Isoroku Yamamoto remained
committed to negotiated settlement, even as he found himself increasingly in the naval minority.

89

Ibid., 165.
Ibid., 168.
91
Ibid., 188.
90

Clark 40

Yamamoto argued that “for Japan to engage in a shipbuilding race with the United States would
be an act of incredible folly that would strain the national economy to the breaking point.”92
Rose summarizes the impact of the pyrrhic victory of the moderates in concluding the London
treaty when he writes that “the London treaty and apparent Anglo-American efforts to intimidate
Japanese sea power not only radicalized the Imperial Navy and its public but also helped fuel the
anger that sent the army careening down a path of uncontrollable aggression toward China.”93
The annexation of Manchuria would shortly ensue.
Against the backdrop of the rising power of the “fleet faction” in the Imperial Japanese
Navy, the erosion of moderate civilian control over the military, and the resumption of a naval
arms race with the United States, a certain Colonel Ishiwara of the Kwantung occupation army
would foment the Japanese takeover of Manchuria. This marked the first clear break with
Japan’s policy of negotiation and reconciliation with the Western powers in the 1920s: while the
Japanese annexation of the Shantung peninsula was one thing, the forced takeover of an area
larger then France and Germany combined could not be ignored. Following the “fake Chinese
attack near the city of Mukden in southern Manchuria,” the Japanese army would spread itself
across the whole of Manchuria.
As Maiolo notes, “defying the League of Nations’ efforts to mediate, Japan recognized
Manchukuo in September 1932 and in 1933 withdrew from the organization altogether.”94 Also
important was that the impetus for the Japanese creation of a puppet state came “not from the
government or army headquarters in Tokyo, but from a conspiracy of Kwantung army officers,
with the sympathy of others in Japan.”95 The impetus for Colonel Ishiwara’s brash move came
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from his deep-seated conviction that Japan must be prepared to fight under the conditions of total
war: “Japan must be a great power or someday fall pretty to one; Manchuria contained many of
the industrial raw materials and the rich farmland that Japan needed for autarky; therefore Japan
must take Manchuria.”96
While Ishiwara may have been radically out of line in his decision to foment the Mukden
incident, Tokyo quickly fell into line. Recognizing the vast industrial potential of the newlycreated puppet state, “a legion of civil servants, engineers, accountants, managers, clerks, skilled
workers and farmers marched in from Japan.” In short, “the creation of Manchukuo helped shift
power away from the party politicians to the military-bureaucratic elite.”97 Following the
assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi by “ultranationalist naval cadets” in May 1932,
“Japan’s prime ministers would be drawn from a mixed bag of admirals, generals and senior
state officials and one from the nobility.”98 The impact on military policy was dramatic: under
finance minister Takahashi Korekiyo (1931-1936), “the military budget rose from 462 million
yen in 1931 to over one billion yen in 1935.”
The Japanese creation of the Manchurian puppet state helped to accelerate the a process
that had begun with the dissatisfaction of hardline naval officers with the Washington Treaty of
1921: Japan increasingly rapidly became a state governed by a “military-bureaucratic elite” that
saw conflict with the West as inevitable; the best thing to do would be to prepare Japan for a
condition of “total war.” This philosophy directly informed the navy’s policy of “southward
expansion” into European-held colonial possessions in Southeast Asia: much like Manchuria,
these were areas rich in strategic resources, and Japanese military control over French Indochina
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and the Dutch East Indies was viewed as crucial to creating a self-sufficient, autarkic industrial
state. To justify such moves as purely “security-seeking” would require a remarkable feat of
mental gymnastics, as these men knew full well that such expansionist policies would bring
Japan into direct conflict with the United States. Moreover, such moves were only necessary to
sustain Japan under a condition of total war- as the arms treaties of the 1920s demonstrate,
alternative policies were entirely possible that would have eliminated the need for such
dangerous strategic thinking. The United States was, after all, the source of nearly 90% of
Japanese oil imports until 1941, when the Roosevelt administration froze all Japanese assets in
the United States in response to the invasion of Indochina.
Even prior to the Japanese abrogation of the Washington / London treaty system, Rose
argues that the Japanese had begun building beyond treaty limits, largely in an effort to revitalize
Japan’s shipbuilding industry that during World War I had seen “the half-dozen commercial
shipyards” increase “to 57, the number of workers in the shipbuilding industry” grow “from
26,000 to 95,000.”99 Rose notes that a dozen heavy cruisers of the Myoko and Takao class,
constructed following the Washington Treaty, “displaced well over that figure [the 10,000 ton
limit], though Tokyo never admitted it.”100 In response to Japanese aggression in Manchuria and
the Shanghai region, the Japanese withdrawal from the Second London Conference as well as
her withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, the Roosevelt administration finally began
asking Congress to appropriate enough funds to permit the U.S. navy to build up to the
Washington treaty limits.
This was the moment the United States began shifting from a policy of cooperation and
accommodation to a policy of competition, which also saw the first material indications of what
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the U.S. economy was truly capable of. By January 1934, the U.S. building program “included
three carriers, seven heavy and four light cruisers, thirty-two destroyers, and a half-dozen
submarines.”101 The Japanese response was unambiguous: “when the Roosevelt administration
showed no inclination to back off… the Fleet faction within the Japanese navy seized the
initiative, and moderates like Yamamoto were overwhelmed and at least temporarily
silenced.”102 Thus, “the Japanese navy announced in March 1934 a ‘second supplemental
building program’ for 1934-1937. It projected forty-eight ships, the maximum allowed under the
London treaty. It augmented air power by eight squadrons. By the end of 1935 Japan had
exceeded the quotas set by the Washington and London treaties. Its ratio compared to the United
States at the end of that year was to be 80 percent, because the United States did not build up the
treaty limits.”103 As worrying as the resumption of a serious naval arms race between Japan and
the United States was, the continued erosion of government authority over military policy was
equally concerning.
After the IJN and the army reached a deal where the navy would support the army’s
policy of continental expansion in China in return for army support of massively increased naval
budgets, Naval Minister Osumi “used the threat of resignation to get his way: Japan now
demanded total naval equality with all other powers, anything less was unacceptable.”104 Despite
the deliberate restraint of the Hoover administration in response to Japanese provocations in
China, “suspicion of American motives and objectives had become entrenched in the Japanese
psyche. Whatever the Americans said or did was considered a direct threat to Japan.”105 Clearly,
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negotiation was off the table: a game of naval bluffing and deterrence was underway, with
potentially catastrophic consequences.
Expansion into Southeast Asia was particularly problematic because the United States
derived a majority of its critical strategic resources from European-held colonial possessions in
the region. When war came, and Southeast Asia fell to Japan, the U.S. would feel the squeeze of
being cut off from these materials. For example, “when Japan took Singapore in February 1942,
cutting off over 90 percent of the world’s supply of natural rubber, the United States had less
than ten months’ supply in the stockpile.”106 Following advances in the early and mid-1930s into
Manchuria and southern China, Japan announced in 1938 its grand plan to create the “Greater
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere;” an empire of Japanese `military rule by other words. Jonathan
Marshall contends that Japan’s push into Southeast Asia in 1940 “brought the war into a ‘new
and ominous stage’ that ‘all but snuffed out any hope of commercial amity between the United
States and the Japanese Empire.’”107 If the annexation of Manchuria marked the first major step
in Japan’s attempt to create, by force, an autarkic empire in East Asia, then the navy’s policy of
southward expansion in the late 1930s marked the culmination of this policy. It was also, by far,
the most risky. As we have seen, the U.S. was willing to acknowledge and, to a degree, respect
the “special relationship” Japan had with China. The Roosevelt administration, however, drew a
red line when it came to Japanese expansion into European possessions in Southeast Asia. For
the first time, core U.S. strategic interests were being directly threatened with Japanese military
power.
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The rise of China in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has coincided with a wave of
economic globalization, but it is not the first time that the vitality of the U.S. economy has
become deeply interlinked with East Asian manufacturing, exports and markets. As Marshall
notes, “in the period 1901-1937, the United States’ import level from Asia and Oceania jumped
more than sixfold, to a level 25 percent higher than U.S. imports from Europe.”108 More
importantly, the U.S. was not importing – as it does today – finished consumer goods from
Chinese factories. The trade situation as it related to Japanese military expansion was much more
problematic because “by 1940, the United States was consuming 60 percent of the world’s
rubber, 45 percent of its chromium, 40 percent of its tin, and 36 percent of its manganese, mostly
or entirely purchased from foreign suppliers.”109 As it happened, most of these war-critical
resources were being imported from the Philippines and European possessions in Southeast Asia.
A 1940 Army and Navy Munitions Board study concluded that the “Far East, especially
Southeast Asia and India” supplied the “most important” of the fourteen strategic materials that
could cause “insurmountable” production difficulties if shortages occurred in wartime.110 As an
example, “Ninety-eight percent of U.S. rubber imports came from Southeast Asia – largely from
British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.”111 Thus, Japanese military expansion into these
areas ceased to be merely a problem of violating international norms for acceptable state
behavior- it threatened the lifeblood of the U.S. industrial economy which would, in a few short
years, be converted into the “arsenal of democracy” described by Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Perhaps, under very different circumstances, the U.S. could have turned a blind eye: if these
areas were not already controlled by the U.S. or friendly European states, if the U.S. was
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cooperating with Japan to deter Great Britain and not the other way around, or if the U.S. did not
have strong reasons to believe that Japan would stop exporting the raw materials under its
newfound control. None of these conditions applied, however. On the last question, Marshall
suggests that Japan’s “deep hostility to the Western powers and aggressive, militaristic foreign
policy gave no reason for optimism.”112
Japan’s policy of southward expansion was born of an aggressive, militaristic foreign
policy created by the same men who sabotaged the Washington and London naval arms treaties.
An important precondition to the military advance into Southeast Asia was the conclusion of the
Tripartite Pact with Fascist Germany and Italy, signed on September 27th, 1940. The pact
“recognized Japan’s sphere of influence in Asia in return for recognition of German and Italian
interests in Europe. Each party pledged to assist the other if attacked ‘by a power at present not
involved in the European War or in the Chinese-Japanese War.’”113 Japan concluded the pact
despite personal reservations by important figures in the Japanese navy, especially Navy
Minister Oikawa. Asada contends that “if he [Oikawa] had had the courage to say, as Yonai did
in 1939, that the navy could not fight the United States, in all likelihood the Tripartite Pact would
have been aborted.”114 But there were enormous pressures to forge ahead with Japan’s
militaristic policy of arming, expansion, and collusion with the Fascist powers: in addition to
Oikawa’s reluctance to voice his concerns about the navy’s capabilities to stand up to the United
States, which could threaten the fundamental reason for naval expansion, “the navy’s desire for a
larger share of appropriations and war material was an important, perhaps the most important,
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factor. I had been anxious to reverse the priority given to the army since the outbreak of the
China war.”115
Just as Japan could have predicted the hostile response of the U.S. to the previous
provocations in China, the abrogation of the naval treaties, and withdrawal from the League of
Nations, “on 28 September 1940, the Intelligence Division estimated that the United States
would be ‘greatly shocked’ by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and would tighten its
economic ‘oppression.’ (On 26 September, President Roosevelt had placed the export of all
grades of scrap iron under government control.)”116 Clearly, Japan and the United States were no
longer engaged in a security dilemma: there was no confusion about U.S. attitudes toward
Japanese foreign policy given its fundamentally greedy motives. Japan was willing to
dramatically escalate Pacific tensions in order to fulfill its dream of creating an autarkic empire
capable of supporting the necessary industrial-economic conditions of total war.
In April 1940, Roosevelt ordered the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor to deter Japan from
expanding into the East Indies.117 Asada provides more evidence of how military policy
continued to influence foreign policy: in the face of a rapidly escalating arms race, and seeking a
clear rationale for obtaining appropriations dominance over the army, “in late March 1941 the
navy restated its position on war. ‘Japan must resort to force,’ it held, ‘when the United States,
alone or in cooperation with Britain and the Netherlands, imposes total embargo,’ thus
threatening Japan’s ‘self-existence and self-defense.’”118 Such concerns would have been
irrelevant had Japan stayed the course set in the 1920s; negotiation and restraint would have
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given little reason to fear the effective total oil embargo from the U.S. that ultimately occurred in
August of 1941.
Moreover, the Roosevelt administration did what it could to communicate resolve in the
face of Japanese expansion: as Sagan tells it, “the United States government began a concerted
effort to persuade the Japanese government that America would intervene in such a contingency.
‘On February 14, Roosevelt was, he [British ambassador Lord Halifax] told Adolf Berle, ‘really
emotional’ when he warned [Japanese ambassador] Nomura [against Japanese aggression:] while
everybody here was doing their best to keep things quiet, … should the dikes ever break (three
sobs), civilization would end.’”119 The Japanese would not be deterred. Faced with the choice of
fighting now, in 1941, or continuing to hemorrhage fighting capability under a near-total trade
embargo, Japan began preparing for the Pearl Harbor attack.
Some international relations theorists belonging to the school of “offensive realism,” like
Mearsheimer, contend that states frequently seek expansion for security purposes: for example,
to create buffer zones between themselves and other great powers. Yet Japan’s policy of imperial
expansion by force in the 1930s places Japan firmly in the category of a greedy state. Japanese
policymakers knew full well what the potential consequences of such an aggressive foreign
policy would entail; moreover, they also knew full well that Japan did not possess the economic
or industrial wherewithal to stand up to the United States in a condition of total war. For these
men, such measured considerations were irrelevant, a negotiated settlement was out of the
question. As Glaser put it, “in a world with one or more greedy states, the [security dilemma]
puzzle largely disappears: the incompatibility of states’ goals provides a straightforward
explanation for competition and conflict.”120 Starting with the annexation of Manchuria in 1931,
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Japan made a series of dramatic foreign policy decisions, where she deliberately chose
competition with the United States and her European allies. As we have seen, this did not have to
be the case: Japan and the U.S. successfully ameliorated the security dilemma in the 1920s
through cooperative policies. Yet the 1930s tell a story of a very different Japan, with disastrous
outcomes.
Conclusion
Evaluating the Sino-American Strategic Relationship

I: Lessons from Pearl Harbor

Japan and the United States did not have to go to war in December of 1941. This is not to
say that the attack on Pearl Harbor was irrational; indeed, it was a rational response to the
strategic dilemma that Japan found itself in following a potentially crippling oil embargo placed
on her by the United States. The puzzle is not why Pearl Harbor, but rather why the embargo,
and why the spiral of events that led to the embargo.
I answer, in chapter two, that the dangerous action-reaction process that led to Pearl
Harbor was initiated by Japan’s shift from a security-seeking state to a greedy state. In the 1920s,
Japan recognized the existence of a security dilemma between herself and the United States,
driven primarily by growing naval power in the Pacific. Crucially, Japanese negotiators also
concluded that the United States was a security-seeker, not a greedy state. Thus, Japan was able
to pursue a strategy of negotiated settlement with the United States without excessive fear of
being placed in a “cooperate-defect” scenario, where the United States would use the negotiating
process to bide its time and enhance its military capabilities at Japan’s expense.
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In the 1930s, a diverse set of factors led Japanese foreign policy to shift from its
emphasis on negotiation and cooperation to a strategy of imperial expansionism. The key
elements in that story were the creation of a Japanese puppet state in Manchuria, the domination
of naval policy by a hardline group of naval officers determined to overthrow the WashingtonLondon treaty system, the decision to unilaterally abrogate the Washington-London treaties, and
finally the policy of southward expansion that put Japan and the United States on a collision
course.
Japan in the 1930s became a state that was uninterested in negotiated settlement, and that
was very difficult to deter. The men in charge of Japanese foreign policy during this period felt
that Japan must expand in order to cement its status as a great power, and to ensure its survival in
a condition of total war. Asada called this mindset “neo-Mahanian determinism,” where
influential military men like Kato Kanji and Ishiwara Kanji became convinced that Japan and the
United States were destined to clash over military and economic interests in East Asia. In the
1930s, it was no longer a question of if a Pacific clash would occur, but when.
Despite the tragic endpoint of the Japanese-American strategic relationship in the
interwar years, it provides a useful case study for evaluating the Chinese-American strategic
relationship today. Despite an enormous degree of economic interdependence, China and the
United States have begun to clash over military-strategic issues such as the deployment of
greater U.S. naval power to East Asia and the militarization of disputed islands in the South
China Sea. Aaron L. Friedberg has characterized the Obama administration’s Pacific policy as
“congagement,” where the U.S. simultaneously engages with China on pressing international
issues such as climate change, but also appears to be pursuing a strategy of containment through
the military aspects of the “pivot to Asia.” Two important questions present themselves: are
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China and the United States engaged in a security dilemma, and are there signs that either state
could become “greedy”? The two key variables in the security dilemma, capabilities and
intentions, can help us answer these questions.

II: Chinese foreign policy through 2008

Some Chinese scholars suggest that up through 2008, China primarily pursued a
cooperative foreign policy designed to maintain amicable relations with China’s neighbors, while
allowing CCP leadership to focus on the country’s varied, and pressing, internal issues. One of
China’s primary goals is to sustain its remarkable economic growth, which requires maintaining
stable relationships with regional powers such as South Korea, Japan, Australia and the ASEAN
community. China’s domestic challenges, to be sure, are great: as Robert Kaplan observes, “China
is able to feed 23 percent of the world’s population from 7 percent of the arable land – ‘by crowding
some 2,000 human beings onto each square mile of cultivated earth in the valleys and flood
plains,’… It now is under popular pressure to achieve something similar – that is, provide a middleclass lifestyle for much of its urban population.”121 Consequently, CCP leadership cares little about
democratization and transparency- such concerns are trivial when attempting to guide a nation of
almost 1.4 billion souls from her former status as a developing country to her emerging role as a
regional superpower.
Citing a speech from former Chinese President Hu Jintao (in office 2003-2013), Li Qingsi
notes that “China’s development goal for the next 20 years is to reach a $4 trillion GDP with $3000
per capita income. The medium and short-term objectives are to catch up with Europe and the
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United States so as to improve the people’s living standards, rather than to challenge the U.S.
hegemony and the existing international order.”122 Moreover, Qingsi claims that “Chinese
leadership has clearly recognized ‘the negative experiences of earlier rising powers, such as
Germany and Japan in the twentieth century, to conclude that China cannot reach its goals of
economic modernization and development through confrontation and conflict.”123 However, even
prior to 2009, when Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea started to become much more
assertive, growing Chinese wealth and power began to engender concerns among some of China’s
neighbors: Qingsi argues that disputes over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands, differing interpretations
of international law regarding Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), and bitter historical memories
of Japan’s occupation of China during World War II have contributed to “a widening gap between
the economic and political relations between China and Japan.”124
With regard to the contemporary development of Chinese foreign policy, Tang Shiping
argues that “at the very least, most analysts reject the notion that China is an offensive-realist state
(i.e., an expansionist, revisionist, or imperialist one) today.”125 Shiping argues that four factors
support this conclusion: China has “toned down its revolutionary rhetoric,” Chinese leaders since
Deng Xiaoping have “clearly recognized some of the most critical aspects of the security dilemma
and its implications,” China has “demonstrated self-restraint and willingness to be constrained by
others,” and finally that “security through cooperation, the hallmark of defensive realism, has
become a pillar of China’s security strategy under Deng.”126 While China’s more aggressive post-
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2009 foreign policy has challenged the notion that China is wholly committed to “security through
cooperation,” at least with the U.S. and her regional treaty allies, Shiping’s summary of China’s
understanding of its contributing role in the security dilemma remains convincing: “China’s
leaders now understand that, because of China’s vast size and power potential, most small and
medium-sized regional states do have reasons to feel uneasy about China’s growing power and to
demand Chinese self-restraint, even if China does not intentionally threaten them.”127
Still, through 2008 Chinese foreign policy could be characterized as largely benign, with
military power rising in proportion to economic growth. Concern among China’s neighbors about
the PRC’s growing regional influence is, to a degree, inevitable. For the first time since 1945, a
slow but steady shift in the regional geopolitical balance is occurring, and absolute U.S. hegemony
in East Asia is being challenged. Yet prior to recent flare-ups over freedom of navigation and
territorial disputes, Beijing appeared to be committed to maintaining a focus on domestic
development, abstaining from leveraging its newfound military power to challenge the existing
international order in East Asia. From a structural perspective, Zhu Feng argued in 2008 that “the
unipolar ‘American system’ and ongoing U.S. efforts to make its hegemonic position
‘unchallengeable’ have reduced China’s balancing options and compelled China to bandwagon
with the United States.”128 While the more aggressive Chinese foreign policy pursued since 2009
indicates that China is not yet satisfied with mere “bandwagoning,” a corollary to Feng’s argument
remains relevant: “even if China attempted to balance U.S. power through cooperation with other
great powers, it would ultimately have no choice but to conciliate the United States; it would be
impossible for Beijing to find great powers willing to participate in a rival coalition against the
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United States.”129 The last observation is astute: both the regional, and global, balance of power
remains firmly in favor of the US. As G. John Ikenberry argues, “China faces an international
order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not
just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rulesbased, with wide and deep political foundation.”130
The regional balance of power is not in China’s favor. Regional U.S. allies include South
Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, none of which seem poised
to bandwagon with China. While Russia remains a potential balancing partner against the U.S.,
Feng counters that although “the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has
been perceived as Beijing-Moscow-centered ‘counterbalancing’ against the United States… the
SCO is a subregional organization and Beijing is primarily motivated by its security and energy
interests in Central Asia rather than by the U.S. presence in East Asia.”131 The ASEAN community
remains a final option for China to persuade regional states to bandwagon with her against U.S.
hegemony: Jorg Friedrich argues that without clear Chinese or Japanese leadership, “the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains the most important institutional hub,
or focal point, for security cooperation in East Asia.”132 Yet there is no evidence that China is
seeking to dominate ASEAN for its own purposes; rather, it serves as a useful forum to “socialize”
China into the region and provides an outlet for informal Chinese leadership on economic and
security issues. As Friedrichs contends, “precisely because ASEAN constitutes an enticing block
of follower states, it has some leeway to balance the great powers against each other… This is
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important because it offers the regional giants an opportunity to exercise various kinds of informal
regional leadership but without incurring the considerable cost of openly exerting regional
hegemony.”133 In short, “the importance of multilateral regional institutions such as the APT, EAS
and ARF to peaceful change should not be overstated. They complement but by no means replace
the traditional U.S. – centered security regime. In fact the importance of the U.S. as an offshore
balancer seems to be increasing, not declining, as a consequence of China’s rise.”134
In short, the period of Chinese history from Deng Xiaoping’s ascension to power through
2008 has been marked by Beijing’s emphasis on internal development and peaceful international
relations. There were no serious indicators that China was interested in becoming a “greedy” state
bent on military expansion and coercion of its smaller neighbors. However, following the election
of Barack Obama, there have been indicators that Chinese foreign policy in East Asia has become
more assertive, and more willing to use newfound military power to challenge the status quo. These
provocations have come primarily in the form of territory disputes in the South China Sea, as well
as Chinese-American clashes over freedom of navigation through disputed waters.

III: The “Pivot,” military competition and South China Sea disputes

Since 2009, Chinese foreign policy has become more assertive, causing significant
consternation among leaders of the United States and the network of US allies in East Asia.
China has embarked on a vigorous campaign to overhaul the People’s Liberation Army (and its
associated air and naval branches), which last year contributed to a defense budget of at least
$216 billion, according to SIPRI. GDP and estimated defense spending indicate that China is
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now the world’s second-largest economy, and the world’s second-largest defense spender. In
particular, China is transforming the PLA from a land-based force with limited power-projection
capabilities into a 21st century military with heavy emphasis on air and naval power. Beijing is
also increasingly willing to demonstrate China’s growing regional power. The most prominent
examples are ongoing South China Sea disputes over maritime borders, fishing, and hydrocarbon
production rights, as well as Chinese land reclamation efforts to turn tiny rocks and reefs in this
hotly contested body of water into useable military installations.
The change in Chinese tone beginning in 2009 was no coincidence, and was informed by
two important developments. First, Beijing observed, correctly, that the 2008 global financial
crisis would hurt the Western economies much more than its own. Second, Beijing likely gauged
that the newly minted presidency of Barack Obama would be less hostile toward Chinese power
and influence in East Asia than his predecessor, giving Beijing a window of opportunity to test
the boundaries of acceptable international behavior. As Friedberg argues, “within a year of
taking office, the new president was forced to confront troubling evidence that his initial
attempts at ‘reassurance’ had not only failed to cause Beijing to moderate its behavior, but may
actually have encouraged it to act more assertively than it might otherwise have done.”135 While
official Chinese policy continues to fervently eschew force as a solution to international
problems, Beijing’s strategy since 2009 has been one of “costly signaling” as it seeks to clarify
its role as an emerging great power. China’s claim to nearly all of the South China Sea through
the “nine-dash line” and its militarization of the regions’ small islands and reefs have shifted the
strategic dialogue away from economic and diplomatic issues, and toward traditional hard power
competition.
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China has compelling reasons to expand its military (and particularly naval) power in
East Asia. The South China Sea region has, in recent years, become flush with international
disputes: “China and Japan have conflicting claims of sovereignty to the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands; in the latter, China has conflicting sovereignty claims with Taiwan, the Philippines, and
Vietnam to some or all of the Spratly Islands, and with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands. (China
also has other serious territorial conflicts in the South China Sea with Malaysia and Brunei).”136
Resources, as they did in Japanese foreign policy in the 1930s, play an important role in
incentivizing Chinese boldness: “there are also significant deposits of oil and gas that China
hopes to exploit, making the South China Sea a ‘second Persian Gulf’ in some estimations.”137
Well before the current round of maritime crises in East Asia, the United States and
China have found themselves at odds over Taiwan. During the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, the
United States dispatched “two carrier battle groups to the region to signal resolve,” after China
“twice lobbed dummy missile warheads into the Taiwan Strait in a vain attempt to frighten
voters away from an avowedly pro-independence candidate.”138 For the time being, however,
headlines have shifted away from Taiwan and toward the South China Sea.
First elucidated in 2011, the current U.S. response to Chinese military moves has come in
the nebulous “Pivot to Asia” strategy. While there are diplomatic, military and economic
components to this strategy, the military components are the most prominent. Robert Ross argues
that “Beijing’s tough diplomacy stemmed not from a confidence in its might… but from a deep
sense of insecurity born of several nerve-wracking years of financial crisis and social unrest.”139
The Obama administration responded to Chinese provocations by expanding “joint naval
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exercises with Japan to prepare for the defense of disputed islands, reached new agreements to
sell arms to the Philippines, and, most recently, in April 2012, agreed to send U.S. marines to
Australia.”140 The Obama administration also made important diplomatic contributions to the
pivot, when it “improved relations with Burma (also called Myanmar); signed the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the founding document of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations; joined the East Asian Summit; and saw to it that the EAS and the
ASEAN Regional Forum… actually addressed important issues.”141
While such diplomatic moves have helped to bolster the status quo international order in
East Asia, and reassure U.S. allies in the region, Thomas J. Christensen also contends that “none
of these laudable diplomatic moves required the exaggerated language about a pivot, which fed
into Chinese conspiracy theories about alleged U.S. containment and encirclement.”142 Attempts
by a security-seeker to signal benign intentions are difficult to calibrate; they can either go too
far in suggesting a complete reorientation of a state’s foreign policy toward a potential
competitor, or do too little in failing to communicate resolve in the face of aggression. As of late,
military concerns have dominated headlines: “…China has triggered worries throughout the
region by pursuing large-scale land reclamation and infrastructure projects on disputed reefs,
leading U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to castigate Beijing at the May 2015 Shangri-La
Dialogue.”143
In response, “the United States finds itself using military assets on a fairly frequent basis
to send signals to Beijing about U.S. interests in the East China and South China Seas.”144 In the
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1930s, the U.S. began building up its naval forces and deploying more military power to the
Pacific too late to have any significant deterrent effect on the Japanese. While probably not
making a deliberate historical comparison, the Obama administration is seeking to deter any
potential Chinese aggression before it can emerge. Simultaneously, in order to avoid
communicating that the U.S. is a hostile power bent on containing any growth in regional
Chinese influence, the pivot pursues diplomatic and economic engagement China, regional U.S.
allies and the ASEAN community.

IV: The Naval Balance

Andrew Scobell and Andre J. Nathan discuss Chinese naval strategy in a threepart timeline: by 2000, according to Admiral Liu Huaqing, the PLA-N would be able to operate
in the “First Island Chain.” Expanding its “operational reach” to the “Second Island Chain”
would occur by 2020, and finally, the PLA-N would attain “global sea power on par with the
U.S. Navy by 2050.”145 Is, or was, this timeline realistic, and does it change the threat calculus
with respect to American interests and security?
According to a 2015 report from the Office of Naval Intelligence, the PLA-N has already
attained the capacity and capability necessary for the first two objectives. China now possesses
63 diesel-electric submarines, five nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), and four nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)146. Furthermore, China possesses at least 21 modern
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destroyers, the backbone of modern naval power, and at least 170 missile-armed small surface
combatants- frigates, corvettes and patrol boats.147 Taken together, these assets represent an
enormous amount of anti-ship firepower in the South China Sea region, without including over a
thousand short to medium-range ballistic missiles operated by the 2nd Artillery Force, some of
which are DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). However, this force structure- a
emphasis on small, agile missile platforms and hunter-killer submarines, does not conform to the
objective of seeking “global sea power.” China will likely never achieve the 2050 goal of
matching American global naval dominance, which has important repercussions for balance-ofthreat theory regarding the United States and China. The U.S. Navy, by contrast, fields
approximately 71 nuclear-powered submarines, 85 cruisers and destroyers, and eleven nuclearpowered, catapult-equipped aircraft carriers.148 The force structure of the USN is a true bluewater navy, with the carrier battle group as its centerpiece.
The downside is that the USN only operates approximately 26 small surface combatants,
the Littoral Combat Ship, which possess a 57 mm cannon as its sole offensive armament. Thus,
in a conflict with China, the USN would be well suited to cut off commercial shipping to China
not within the South China Sea (where Chinese naval power is strongest), but even farther out,
likely in the Indian Ocean. This strategic reality provide a very strong hedge against a worst-case
scenario involving a war with China. On the other hand, the Chinese military is well positioned
to assert naval dominance in the South China Sea region. Taken together, these differing naval
strategies provide good counterweights to each other, and incentivize bilateral cooperation on
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pressing security issues. Thus, Thomas M. Kane concludes that “for the ‘foreseeable future, the
primary task of the PLA Navy will continue to be defined at the regional level.’”149
The Obama administration has concluded that demonstrating resolve is important at this
stage in the security dilemma in order to avoid communicating any sort of ambiguity over what
American interest are in the region and how far the U.S. will go to protect those interests. Much
as war between Imperial Japan and the United States in 1941 was far from inevitable, conflict
between China and the U.S. today is not a foregone conclusion. However, successful resolution
of the outstanding issues requires both sides to recognize each other’s legitimate interests and
concerns, much as Japan and the U.S. were able to do through the Washington naval arms treaty.
There are few indicators to suggest that China today is truly a “greedy” state: Xi Jinping and the
CCP leadership appear to remain firmly in control of the PLA, and there are no signs that China
is preparing to go on the warpath in East Asia. A serious possibility remains, however, that an
arms race between China, the U.S. and American allies in the region could accelerate, which
would aggravate the Sino-American strategic relationship with potentially disastrous
consequences. In the future, the Japanese case provides a set of “warning signs” that could
indicate a shift in Chinese foreign policy toward something more aggressive and less
accommodating to the interest of her smaller neighbors and the US. Among these would be
increasing control of the PLA over Chinese foreign policy, the deployment of greater naval
power to coerce smaller states in the region over territory and resource disputes, and rhetoric
from Beijing that paints the U.S. as an enemy whose regional interests cannot be reconciled with
Chinese objectives.
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History need not repeat itself. As former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd notes,
the counter-argument to the inevitability of the structural security dilemma lies in “that politics,
diplomacy and leadership all matter; that individuals shape history, sometimes incrementally,
other times decisively; and therefore that alternate futures are always possible.”150 The bottom
line is that if there is a nascent security dilemma between China and the United States, it is not
nearly as severe as the one that characterized Pacific geopolitics in the interwar years. The web
of U.S. treaty allies in the region serves as a strong deterrent against blatant Chinese aggression,
and the elimination of European and American colonial possession in East Asia has removed one
of the primary factors that contributed to fear of rising Japanese naval power in the 1920s. Yet
tensions in the region, particularly over disputed territory in the South China Sea, continue to
mount. Some commentators now speak of the “militarization” of the region, and a case could be
made that a region-wide arms race is beginning to emerge. Thus, now is a crucial time for the
U.S. and China “get it right” in terms of their strategic relationship, in order to ensure economic
and military stability in the region that Barack Obama has repeatedly identified as “the part of
the world of greatest consequence to the American future, and that no president can take his eye
off of.”151 The last time an aspiring great power challenged the East Asian status quo, the results
were disastrous. Today, incentives for Sino-American cooperation are strong, and barriers to
regional militarism are higher than they were in the 1930s. The next several decades will decide
whether conflict or peace is the dominant paradigm in East Asia.
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